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COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND COUNTERINTUITIVE
COUNTERTERRORISM: THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11




The United States has a long and rich history of protecting individu-
als fleeing persecution. The country was founded as a haven from reli-
gious persecution, and became home to Quakers, Puritans, Catholics,
Huguenots and other religious denominations unwelcome in England and
other parts of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.' This
tradition has survived several periods of intense xenophobia, racially-
based exclusionary policies, national security threats, and war.
The United States currently offers protection to individuals and
families fleeing persecution through two programs: the overseas refugee
resettlement program and the asylum system. The refugee resettlement
program is available for refugees residing outside the United States; the
asylum system is for those who apply for refugee protection on U.S. soil.
The most recent assault on the U.S. tradition and obligation to provide
protection to those fleeing persecution has affected both of these pro-
grams.
When recalling the United States' first major anti-terrorism effort in
response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the October 7, 2001 inva-
sion of Afghanistan is in the foremost action in the nation's collective
memory. Even before invading Afghanistan, however, the U.S. govern-
ment had begun implementing anti-terrorism measures in another arena:
the refugee resettlement program. Approximately two weeks after the
attacks, the federal government imposed a moratorium on refugee admis-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. This Article is adapted
from two prior articles, The W Visa: A Legislative Proposal for Female and Child Refugees
Trapped in a Post-9/1l World, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 459 (2005) and Terrorism and Asylum
Seekers: Why the Real ID Act is a False Promise, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101 (2006). Thanks to the
Denver University Law Review, particularly Symposium Editor Jack Hobaugh, for inviting me to
participate in their 2007 Symposium, "Immigration: Both Sides of the Fence." Thanks also to my
colleague at Chapman University School of Law, Professor Matthew Parlow, for facilitating and
encouraging my participation in this Symposium; to Clinton Rusich for assistance rehearsing my
symposium presentation; and to my outstanding and supportive research assistant Neda Sargordan.
1. See WILLIAM CARLSON SMITH, AMERICANS IN THE MAKING: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF
THE ASSIMILATION OF IMMIGRANTS 4-5 (1939) (noting that the United States was "vaunted as a land
not only of economic opportunity but also of religious freedom .... "); see also International Reli-
gious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C.A. § 6401(a)(1) (West 2007) (noting that "[m]any of our
Nation's founders fled religious persecution abroad, cherishing in their hearts and minds the ideal of
religious freedom"). See generally ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA: A HISTORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICAN LIFE 94-95 (1990).
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sions, stranding thousands of refugees and creating a backlog from which
the refugee resettlement program still has not recovered.2
Considered in a vacuum, the fact that the United States might
choose to target U.S.-bound refugee populations for its anti-terrorism
measures may not seem terribly surprising. However, additional facts
call into question the wisdom and efficacy of imposing a refugee reset-
tlement moratorium: first, none of the nineteen September 11 hijackers
were refugees; and second, the mechanism through which several of the
September 11 hijackers actually were able to enter the United States,
known as Visa Express, continued to operate for almost a year after the
attacks.
3
Likewise, the asylum system, which also had not been utilized by
any of the September 11 hijackers, did not escape retribution. On May
11, 2005, Congress passed the Real ID Act, 4 which included a section
entitled "Preventing Terrorists from Obtaining Relief from Removal,
5
that purported to reform the asylum system. Again, at first glance, par-
ticularly if one is persuaded by the title of the section, such legislation
seems prudent and perhaps even urgently necessary. A careful perusal of
the asylum section of the Real ID Act, however, reveals that the legisla-
2. See DAVID A. MARTIN, THE UNITED STATES REFUGEE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM: REFORMS
FOR A NEW ERA OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 153 (2004) available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/36495.pdf [hereinafter MARTIN, REFORMS]:
All refugee movements had been suspended in the immediate aftermath of the September
11 attacks, a halt that lasted approximately two months. In the meantime, the new secu-
rity and anti-fraud steps that were introduced beginning in November 2001 were applied
not just to the consideration of new refugee applicants but also to any refugees who had
not yet traveled. Given the confusion and enormous backlogs resulting from problems at
many steps of the process, many thousands of refugees who thought they had been ap-
proved and were ready to fly to the United States languished for months or years without
a final decision on their cases.
Id. The new security screening procedures introduced after September 1I led to "many months of
confusion, inefficiency, and delays .. " Id. at 154.
All P-3 cases that had not yet traveled to the United States as of September 11, 2001,
were subjected to the new verification process. This meant that a significant number of
persons who thought that they had been approved for admission saw their cases reopened
and their approvals suspended. Notifications of discrepancies were sometimes delayed, as
were notifications of final revocation of admission approval. Therefore many refugees
who thought they had been fully approved for resettlement in the United States found
themselves in limbo for months, and a great many for years.
Id. at 86; see also Ralston H. Deffenbaugh, Jr., President, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Ser-
vice, Continuing Crisis in the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program, Jan. 2002, available at
http://www.lirs.org/news/PresDesk/RD20020l .htm.
3. See George Gedda, Official Inquiry Ordered for All Visa-Issuing Foreign Posts,
ASSOCIATED PRESS WORLDSTREAM, July 17, 2002, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/717317/posts (reporting that 64% of 36,028 visas issued to Saudis between June 1, 2001
through Sept. 10, 2001 - 64% through Visa Express, only 3% of 64% interviewed; Senator Chuck
Grassley and Rep. Dave Weldon said that 3 out of 15 hijackers obtained visa through Visa Express);
Ben Barber, Visa Express Discontinued in Saudi Arabia; State Bows to Critics on Hill, WASH.
TIMES, July 20, 2002, at 1 (shut down Visa Express on July 20).
4. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and
Tsunami Relief(Real ID Act), Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005).
5. Id. § 101.
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tion does nothing more than clumsily codify existing asylum case law.
The vague and awkwardly worded provisions of the Real ID Act thereby
increase the likelihood that bona fide asylum claims will fail while doing
little or nothing to prevent fraudulent claims from succeeding.
This Article critiques the anti-terrorism measures of the United
States that directly target refugees and asylum-seekers. Part I briefly
discusses the history of refugee protection in the United States. Parts II
and III describe the processes and security measures which all applicants
for refugee and asylee status must undergo in order to gain protection
from the United States. Parts II and III also explain the inefficacy and
counter-productivity of the post-September 11 anti-terrorism measures
targeting refugees and asylum seekers, and conclude that those measures
were counterproductive and counterintuitive.
I. HISTORY OF U.S. ASYLUM AND REFUGEE LAW: 1939-1980
The United States' long history of providing protection to those
fleeing persecution abroad has been tempered by periodic xenophobia,
political bias, and lack of uniformity. Although the tradition of refugee
protection predates the official birth of the nation, statutory refugee pro-
tection in the form of asylum and the overseas refugee resettlement pro-
gram did not exist prior to 1980. Even with a statute in place, the admis-
sion of refugees and adjudication of asylum claims have not always op-
erated smoothly, and both forms of protection have remained in constant
flux.
A. Pre-World War 1I." The S.S. St. Louis
Prior to onset of the Cold War, the United States did not have laws
specifically permitting refugee admissions. Immigration occurred pri-
marily through a nationality-based quota system; when the allotted num-
ber of visas ran out for a particular country or region, applicants had to
wait until a visa became available in order to immigrate. 6 The first inti-
mation that this system was inadequate surfaced shortly before World
War II began, when Nazi persecution was compelling many Jews and
other minorities to flee Europe.
On June 6, 1939, the S.S. St. Louis, a German transatlantic liner
carrying more than 900 European Jews fleeing Nazi persecution, peti-
tioned the United States for permission to enter its territory. By this
6. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, 159-60 (repealed 1952).
7. U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Voyage of the "St. Louis," in HOLOCAUST
ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang=en&Moduleld=10005267
(last visited Apr. 8, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Voyage of the "St.
Louis']. The refugees were originally en route to Cuba, but the Cuban government revoked their
landing passes and denied them entry. Id.; see also U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Wartime
Fate of the Passengers of the "St. Louis," in HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at
http://wwwl .ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?lang--en&Moduleld= 10005431 (last visited Apr. 8, 2007)
[hereinafter U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Wartime Fate of the Passengers of the "St. Louis ']
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time, the German-Austrian quota for U.S. immigration had not only been
filled but had a waiting list of several years.8 Entry to the United States
would have required an executive order from President Roosevelt, who
declined to issue one.
9
While the St. Louis made its way back to Europe, Jewish organiza-
tions secured admission for most of the refugees to western European
countries. The passengers arrived in Antwerp, Belgium after five weeks
at sea. They settled in Belgium, France, Great Britain, and the Nether-
lands to await their turn to enter the United States through the back-
logged quota system. Approximately four months later, World War II
broke out. Eventually, all of the countries to which the St. Louis passen-
gers were sent, with the exception of Great Britain, came under Nazi
control. "Thus, in the end, the former 'St. Louis' passengers underwent
experiences similar to those of other Jews in Nazi-occupied western
Europe. The Germans murdered many of them in the killing centers and
the concentration camps. Others went into hiding or survived years of
forced labor." 10
B. Post- World War 1I: The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees
In the aftermath of the Nazi atrocities of World War II, refugee pro-
tection gained prominence in the international community. The United
Nations General Assembly promulgated the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees in 195111 to provide protection to refugees displaced
as a result of World War II. In 1967, the United Nations updated the
1951 Convention with the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
1 2
to address a refugee flow that had arisen out of incidents other than
World War 11.13
In 1968, the United States signed and ratified the 1967 Protocol.
14
In acceding to the 1967 Protocol, the United States agreed to grant pro-
tection to persons who meet the international legal definition of a refu-
gee:
(describing the various fates of the passengers returned to Germany, many of whom were placed in
internment camps, transported to Nazi death camps, or forced to live in hiding for the remainder of
the war).
8. U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Voyage of the "St. Louis, " supra note 7.
9. Id.
10. U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Wartime Fate of the Passengers of the "St. Louis,"
supra note 7. It is estimated that 250 of the St. Louis passengers died in the Holocaust. See U.S.
Holocaust Memorial Museum, Voyage of the "St. Louis, " supra note 7.
11. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force July 28, 1951) [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
12. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
13. See id., Preamble (stating that because the scope of the 1951 Convention is limited to
persons who became refugees as a result of incidents prior to 1951, the Convention should be broad-
ened to address refugee populations that have emerged after 1951).
14. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 12, at 1.
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Any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular so-
cial group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [or her]
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself [or herself] of the protection of that country; or who, not hav-
ing a nationality and being outside the country of his [or her] former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
15
Prior to signing the Protocol, the United States' policy on granting
refugee status reflected its Cold War political concerns. The Immigra-
tion Act of 195216 and the 1965 amendments to the Immigration Act
17
allowed only refugees from either communist countries or countries in
the Middle East to qualify for asylum. 18 Asylum seekers who did fall
within these narrow parameters still had to demonstrate a "clear probabil-
ity" of persecution (a higher standard than the "reasonable possibility"
standard that exists today) before being accepted as refugees.' 9 They
were also subject to strict numerical limitations.2°
The United States' assent to the Protocol did not have a significant
effect on asylum processing. The United States relied on the portion of
the 1952 Act that authorized the Attorney General "to withhold the de-
portation of any alien within the United States to any country in which in
his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion and for such period of time as he deems to
be necessary for such reasons. ,2 1 From 1968 to 1980, the United States
continued to enforce the narrow parameters, low ceiling on approvals,
15. See id, art. 1, 2 (adopting the 1951 Convention's definition of "refugee" with modifica-
tions to eliminate the 1951 Convention's exclusive application to World War II refugees); see also
1951 Convention supra note 11, art. 1, A(2) (defining a "refugee").
16. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(7), re-
pealed by Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 108 (1980) [hereinafter INA].
17. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat.
911, 913 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Amendments].
18. Id. at 913. The general area of the Middle East included western Libya, northern Turkey,
eastern Pakistan, southern Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia. Id.
19. See Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 1976) (sustaining denial of asylum
where applicants failed to demonstrate a "clear probability" of persecution); Pierre v. U.S., 547 F.2d
1281, 1289 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the burden was on the asylum seeker to show that she was a
refugee by a "clear probability" standard of proof); Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir.
1977) (holding that in order to prove a well-founded fear of persecution, an asylum applicant must
demonstrate a "clear probability" of persecution).
20. See INA § 201(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1503 (West 2007)) (setting
an annual refugee quota based on nationality); Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67
Stat. 400 § l(a) (1953), amended by Act of Aug. 31, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-751, 68 Stat. 1044 (mak-
ing available 209,000 refugee visas exempt from the 1952 nationality based quota); see also Deb-
orah E. Anker & Michael J. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act
of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 13-14 (1981) (remarking that Congress' exceptions to immigra-
tion policy were strictly responses to Soviet expansionism, and should not be viewed as humanitar-
ian commitments).
21. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. V. 1970) (now INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1231 (b)(3) (West 2007)).
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and strict burden of proof mandated by the 1952 Act and the courts. 22 It
was not until 1980 that Congress passed legislation implementing the
United States' obligations under the 1967 Protocol by codifying the 1951
Convention definition of a refugee and establishing a legal right to apply
for asylum.
C. The Refugee Act of 1980
In 1980, Congress for the first time passed a law specifically ad-
dressing refugees and asylum seekers: the Refugee Act of 1980.23 In
enacting the Refugee Act, Congress sought to give "statutory meaning to
our national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns.
24
The Refugee Act removed the geographical and political limitations from
the asylum process, 25 explicitly adopted the Protocol's definition of a
"refugee, 26 formulated a legal right to seek asylum in the United
States, 27 and lifted the numerical caps on yearly grants of asylum. 28 In
addition, the Refugee Act mandated that the Attorney General establish
procedures for asylum processing.29
22. KAREN MUSALO, REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 64 (1997); see
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413, 429-30 (1984) (articulating the standard for eligibility for with-
holding of removal).
23. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C.A. §§ 1157-1159 (West 2007) [hereinafter Refugee Act].
24. S. REP. No. 96-256, at 1 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 141.
25. The Refugee Act repealed INA § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7), which had reserved
refugee protection primarily for individuals fleeing Communist and certain Middle Eastern coun-
tries.
26. See INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (West 2007). The INA defines a
refugee as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a
person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and who is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
See id.
27. See INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(1) (West 2007) (authorizing "[a]ny alien who
is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States" to apply for asylum).
The Refugee Act provided a new discretionary form of relief for asylum seekers. Relief under
section 243(h) of the INA, which provided for mandatory withholding of removal, remained avail-
able for refugees who did not warrant a favorable exercise of discretion or who were statutorily
barred from qualifying for asylum. See INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. 1231 (b)(3)(A) (West 2007)
(prohibiting the removal of certain noncitizens who face persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion). The Supreme Court in
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-32 (1987), differentiated between the burden of proof
for those seeking asylum and those seeking withholding, holding that asylum seekers must prove a
reasonable possibility of persecution, whereas individuals seeking withholding must still meet the
pre-Refugee Act standard of "clear probability." See id. at 430.
28. See INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (West 2007) (authorizing the Attor-
ney General to grant asylum to an alien who meets the definition of refugee, without any numerical
restrictions).
29. INA § 208(d)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(d)(1) (West 2007). The Attorney General issued
regulations in 1990 that created a professional corps of asylum officers; vested initial jurisdiction of
affirmative asylum claims with the Office of Refugees, Asylum and Parole; established filing proce-
dures for applications for asylum; established interview procedures; set forth eligibility require-
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The passage of the Refugee Act ushered in a new era of refugee
protection. The Supreme Court recognized the implications of the Refu-
gee Act in the ground-breaking case of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,30 which
articulated a new, lower standard of proof for asylum eligibility, differen-
tiating it from that of withholding of removal. 31 In 1990, reacting to al-
legations of persistent geopolitical bias within the asylum system,32 the
INS promulgated new regulations for the prompt and politically neutral
adjudication of asylum claims.33 Finally, in response to allegations that
the asylum system was becoming a haven for terrorists and others seek-
ing to abuse the U.S. immigration system, Congress passed immigration
reform legislation in 1996, discussed in detail in Section III.A.2, infra,
that made significant changes to the asylum system.34
Despite the developments and reforms of the 1990s, and the inhos-
pitality of both systems to individuals seeking to abuse the U.S. immigra-
tion system, both the overseas refugee resettlement program and the asy-
lum system have been targets of counterterrorism policies and legisla-
tion.
II. OVERSEAS REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM
The U.S. refugee resettlement program is likely the least hospitable
avenue for entering the United States for an individual seeking to carry
out terrorism. Only 70,000 refugees per year out of thirteen million
refugees worldwide are selected to resettle in the United States. Selec-
tion is based on a complex priority system and often dependent on one's
membership in a group of individuals identified by the U.S. government
as particularly at risk due to their religion, ethnicity, tribe, and/or other
factors. Many refugees live for years in dirty, violent, disease-ridden
camps, with no guarantee of resettling elsewhere.
A. The Refugee Resettlement Process Pre-September 11
In order to resettle in the United States, applicants must (1) meet the
definition of a refugee, 35 (2) be among those refugees whom the Presi-
ments; and established procedures for granting derivative status to immediate family members. See
Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208 (2007).
30. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
31. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430-33.
32. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASYLUM: UNIFORM APPLICATION OF STANDARDS
UNCERTAIN 22 (1987) (reporting discrepancies among asylum seekers claiming similar levels and
forms of persecution, with applicants from countries with regimes the United States opposed, such as
Iran, having much higher approval rates than applicants from countries with U.S.-supported regimes,
such as El Salvador).
33. Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,674 (Immigration
and Naturalization Service July 27, 1990) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3, 103, 208, 236, 242, 253).
34. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
35. See INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (West 2007); see also supra note
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36dent determines to be of special humanitarian concern, (3) be otherwise
admissible under U.S. law, 37 and (4) not be "firmly resettled" 38 in another
country.39 Once an individual is selected for resettlement, he or she must
undergo a rigorous screening process administrated by the Bureau of
Populations, Refugees and Migration ("PRM") of the Department of
State in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security4° and the
Office of Refugee Resettlement ("ORR") of the Department of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") for resettlement processing.4'
Upon receiving a referral from the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees or a non-governmental organization, applicants for
resettlement in the United States must proceed through several more lev-
els of adjudication. First, the U.S. Department of State evaluates the
cases based on the applicants' situation in the country of first asylum, the
conditions from which they have fled, U.S. national interest, and other
humanitarian considerations.4 a Second, applicants who appear to have
suffered persecution or to have a well-founded fear of future persecu-
tion,43 and who otherwise fall within the United States' resettlement pri-
orities must then meet with a U.S. immigration official to determine
whether they qualify for admission as a refugee. 4 Once the immigration
36. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1 157(a)(3) ("Admissions under this subsection shall be allocated among
refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States in accordance with a determination by
the President after appropriate consultation.").
37. See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (classifying groups of aliens ineligible for visas or
admission).
38. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(vi), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.15
(2007) (providing guidance on determining whether an applicant for asylum was firmly resettled in
another country).
39. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK:
COUNTRY CHAPTERS: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 (2004), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3c5e5a764.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR, COUNTRY CHAP-
TERS: USA] (describing resettlement policies and procedures in United States).
40. Formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). See Dep't of Homeland
Security, History: Who Became Part of the Department?, Sep. 13, 2006,
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm.
41. See UNHCR, COUNTRY CHAPTERS: USA, supra note 39, at 1 (noting four key criteria for
refugee admission in United States).
42. See id. at 4 (noting procedures which the United States uses to determine whether to
accept refugees).
43. See Matter of Mogharabbi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987) (holding that an indi-
vidual's fear of persecution is well-founded if he or she "(1) possesses a characteristic a persecutor
seeks to overcome in others by means of punishment of some sort; (2) the persecutor is already
aware, or could.., become aware, that the [individual] possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the
persecutor has the capability of punishing the [individual]; and (4) the persecutor has the inclination
to punish the [person]." (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211,226 (B.I.A. 1985))).
44. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2007) ("The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be
sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration."). The situation of refugees often
makes it difficult for them to provide documentary or third party testimonial corroboration of their
claims, but U.S. regulations governing asylum, in conformity with U.N. recommendations, specify
that an applicant's credible testimony is sufficient to establish eligibility. See id.; see also UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, 196, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV. 1 (1992) [hereinafter UNHCR,
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA] ("In most cases a person fleeing from persecution will
2007] COUNTERPRODUCTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM 1129
authorities approve an applicant for resettlement, the applicant must un-
dergo a medical examination and security checks before travel arrange-
ments to the United States can be made. This process can take several
years, during which time many refugees must live in precarious situa-
tions, often living in refugee camps plagued by disease, violence, and
overcrowding.45
B. Post-September 11 Refugee Resettlement Moratorium
Despite the procedures and security checks described in Part II.A,
supra, and despite the fact that none of the September 11 hijackers were
refugees,46 the United States immediately suspended refugee resettlement
for several months as part of its response to the September 11 terrorist
attacks.47 During that time, the U.S. government carried out new back-
ground checks and investigations of family relationships.48 When the
U.S. refugee resettlement program did resume in February 2002, it was
with the implementation of new, far stricter security mechanisms that
apply even to the highest priority refugees.
First, refugees, including those already accepted for resettlement,
now have to undergo new security checks prior to gaining admission to
the United States.4 9 Even prior to September 11, the U.S. State Depart-
ment checked all applicants for resettlement against the Refugee Infor-
mation Entry Sub-system of the Consular Lookout and Support System
("CLASS"), a database searched using names and dates of birth.5 °
have arrived with the barest necessities and very frequently even without documents. . . .[I]f the
applicant's account appears credible, he [or she] should, unless there are good reasons to the con-
trary, be given the benefit of the doubt.").
45. See generally U.S. COMMITrEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2004, avail-
able at http://www.refugees.org/article.aspx?id=1156 (containing various articles and reports de-
scribing the conditions in which the majority of the world's refugees live).
46. See THOMAS R. ELDRIDGE ET AL., 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL: STAFF REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 7-31 (2004) (detailing
each of the September 11 hijackers' visa application processes and encounters with U.S. immigra-
tion personnel). Most of the hijackers applied for and received tourist visas. See id. One applied for
and received a student visa after being denied a tourist visa. See id. at 13-14.
47. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION,
SUMMARY OF REFUGEE ADMISSIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2003 (illustrating drop in refugee admissions
during this time) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS 2003]; see also T. T.
Nhu, Refugee Backlog Remains Sizable; Resettlement Program Resuming After Sept. 11, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 27, 2002.
48. See generally MARTIN, REFORMS, supra note 2, at 84-95 (describing the delays in refugee
processing, particularly those resettling on the basis of family relationships).
49. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FY 2004 - REPORT TO THE CONGRESS iv, available
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/44529.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FY 2004] (stating CLASS checks are based on name and date of
birth). A CLASS check is now done efficiently via WRAPS, triggered as soon as the OPE has
acquired the basic individual information needed to perform the check, and the result is also re-
corded in automated fashion. See id. Most cases clear this check and can then be scheduled for the
remainder of the process).
50. See MARTIN, REFORMS, supra note 2, at 119-20 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS MANUAL, 9 FAM app. D § 201 (2007)).
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CLASS contains the names of persons for whom the State Department
has information, usually derogatory, pertaining to the individuals' appli-
cation for entry into the United States. 51 In the post-September 11 era,
the results of the CLASS check must now be completed and documented
before resettlement offices may proceed any further on the case.5 2 Al-
though the U.S. State Department claims that the security checks now
only take forty-five days to process, they took several months when these
changes first came into effect.53
Other post-September 11 security measures, while not particularly
time consuming compared to the CLASS check, have delayed travel in
another respect: they have caused the amount of available flights for
refugees to decrease significantly.54 As of November 2001, all refugees
who are fourteen-years-old or older at the time of their entry into the
United States must undergo full fingerprinting upon arrival in the United
States.5 5  This process is so cumbersome that the government initially
imposed a thirty-person per flight limit on refugees, 56 a limit which im-
provements in fingerprinting efficiency have allowed to increase only to
thirty-five refugees per flight. 57 Adding to the need for a per flight limit
on refugees is the 2002 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Re-
form Act 58 requirement that all refugees receive an employment authori-
zation document "immediately upon the[ir] arrival in the United States"
and that the document contain a photograph and fingerprint.59
The cumulative result of these measures is that thousands of refu-
gees selected for resettlement, who have been anticipating imminent de-
parture and the start of a new life, have reverted to the anxious waiting
and uncertainty that had characterized the last several years of their lives.
The United States, although it authorized the admission of 70,000 refu-
51. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, 9 FAM app. D § 200 (2007)
(explaining CLASS, Consular Lookout and Support System).
52. See MARTIN, REFORMS, supra note 2, at 119-20 ("New security measures adopted in
November 2001 strictly require documentation in refugee files that such checks have been com-
pleted before the case can proceed."). Furthermore, the State Department has, since 9/11, been
adding additional names and information to the CLASS database. See id. at 120.
53. Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration,
Remarks at the 2004 Annual Conference of State Coordinators of Refugee Resettlement (SCORR)
(July 13, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/pnn/rls/37912.htm; Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant
Secretary for Population, Refugees and Migration, Remarks to the 2004 Annual Conference of
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services (LIRS) (June 18, 2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/prm/rls/37914.htm; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
FY 2004, supra note 49, at 5.
54. See MARTIN, REFORMS, supra note 2, at 130 (discussing the effect of fingerprinting and
other post 9/11 security refugee flights).
55. See id. (noting a November 2001 decision to do full fingerprinting of all refugees 14 and
older upon arrival).
56. See id. ("INS imposed a 30 person per flight refugee limitation on refugee arrivals").
57. See id. (explaining that after the government was able to transfer the fingerprint work to a
subcontractor they raised the per flight quota to thirty-five).
58. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116
Stat. 543 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.A.).
59. Id. § 309.
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gees,60 only admitted 27,029 refugees in fiscal year 2002.61 Fiscal year
2003 saw almost the same low number of refugee entries.62 In fiscal year
2004, the United States fell short of its refugee admission ceiling by
17,125.63
The global insecurity and threats against the United States, upon
which President Bush based his refusal to increase the refugee resettle-
ment quota, have indeed posed a significant challenge to refugee proc-
essing. Attacks by combatants in volatile areas against aid workers,64
volunteer medical personnel, 65 and foreign officials 66 combined with
U.S. security measures to slow the process considerably.67  Moreover,
the very situations from which refugees are trying to escape present
enormous obstacles to their goal. Forced displacement, violence, lack of
infrastructure, illness, and lack of stability are not ideal conditions for
preserving formal identity documents such as passports, birth certificates,
marriage certificates, and the like. Many refugees thus commence the
resettlement process with two substantial strikes against them: (1) the
60. Presidential Determ. No. 2-04, 66 FR 63,487 (Nov. 21, 2001) (Presidential Determination
on FY 2002 Refugee Admissions Numbers and Authorizations of In-Country Refugee Status Pursu-
ant to Sections 207 and 101(a)(42), Respectively, of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and De-
termination Pursuant to Section 2(b)(2) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, as Amended);
Regional Refugee Ceilings and Admissions to the United States, FY 1991-2004, REFUGEE REPS.
(Immigration and Refugee Services of America, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 31, 2003, at 9, available at
http://www.refugees.org/data/refugee reports/archives/2003/RRDec.pdf (showing that prior to 2001,
the United States imposed refugee admission ceilings ranging from 78,000 to 142,000 and the actual
number of refugees admitted to the United States ranged from 70,000 to over 132,000 each year).
61. See George Gedda, Admission of Refugees into U.S. Down, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 3,
2003, available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/IPI -85198340.html.
62. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS 2003, supra note 47, at 5 (stating that
the United States admitted 28,422 refugees in fiscal year 2003, 41,578 short of its ceiling).
63. See Press Release, Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, U.S. Dep't of State, Refugee Admis-
sions for Fiscal Year 2004 (Oct. 4, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2004/36717.htm (stating that the United States admitted 52,875 refugees in fiscal year 2004).
64. See UN Refugee Agency Halts Operations in Troubled Parts of Afghanistan, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 18, 2003, available at http://www.publicintemationallaw.org/
docs/PNW/PNW.24Nov_03.htm#Afghanistan (stating in November 2003, alleged Taliban gunmen
shot and killed 29-year-old UNHCR aid worker Bettina Goislard in Afghanistan; she was the twelfth
aid worker to be killed in Afghanistan since March 2003); see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, PUBL'N NO. 03-663, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: PROTECTING REFUGEE WOMEN AND
GIRLS REMAINS A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE 6 (2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03663.pdf ("[F]rom 1997 through 2001, 106 relief workers were
killed in the line of duty in Afghanistan, Angola, Rwanda, and Sudan.").
65. Amir Shah, Taliban Claims Responsibility for Foreign Workers 'Deaths, OAKLAND TRiB.,
June 3, 2004, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/miqn4l76/is20040603/
ai n14575526 (stating that in June 2004, Taliban militants claimed responsibility for murdering
three members of a volunteer medical team in Afghanistan).
66. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FY 2004, supra note 49, at
15 (indicating that direct threats to U.S. personnel at the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya delayed
resettlement processing).
67. U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION, FACT
SHEET: U.S. GOVERNMENT TO EXPEDITE REFUGEE PROCESSING SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 (2003),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/prmirls/fs/2003/23356.htm ("[Ilnitial overseas security concerns
severely limited Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) adjudications in the field. INS (now
Department of Homeland Security/Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services DHS/CIS)
interviews overseas resumed in force in February 2002, but then were constrained again by security
threats in East Africa, civil unrest in West Africa, and the war in Iraq.").
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inability to prove conclusively who they are and why they are refugees,
and (2) the presumption that they are involved with terrorism.
III. THE UNITED STATES ASYLUM SYSTEM
Next to the refugee resettlement program, the asylum system is ar-
guably the least hospitable means to secure lawful status for an individ-
ual seeking to infiltrate the United States for terrorism-related activities.
A strict one-year filing deadline, restrictions on employment authoriza-
tion, face-to-face interviews with immigration officers, numerous back-
ground and identity checks, and the possibility of detention combine to
create a less-than-ideal environment for an individual seeking to defraud
the United States.
A. The U.S. Asylum System Pre-September 11
1. Security measures
Asylum applicants must undergo identity verification and back-
ground checks before being eligible for asylum.68 The government is-
sues each asylum applicant a file number, or "alien number," which is
entered into the Refugees, Asylum and Parole System ("RAPS") data-
base.69 RAPS interfaces with the Computer Linked Applicant Informa-
tion System ("CLAIMS") to identify and update asylum applicants' ad-
dress changes, and with the Receipt and Alien File Accountability Con-
trol System ("RAFACS") to keep track of asylum applicants' files.7 °
The asylum office may not grant asylum without first checking the iden-
tity of the applicant against all appropriate government databases, includ-
ing the State Department's Consular Lookout and Support System
("CLASS") 71 and the DHS biometric identification system known as
"IDENT.
, 72
2. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996
By the mid-1990's, perceived flaws in the U.S. asylum system had
come to the attention of lawmakers. Processing delays had led to a back-
log of several years, allowing asylum applicants to remain in the United
States legally for the duration of their cases. 73 The law also granted asy-
lum applicants immediate work authorization, renewable on a yearly
68. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9(b), 208.10, 240.67 (2007).
69. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, INS, REFUGEES, ASYLUM
AND PAROLE SYSTEM, AUDIT REPORT 98-11 (1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
oig/reports/INS/a9811 .htm.
70. Id.
71. IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 383 (9th ed. 2004).
72. Id. at 100.
73. See INS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ASYLUM REFORM: FIVE YEARS LATER 7 (2000), avail-




basis until the asylum adjudication was complete.74 Concerns abounded
that economic migrants, unscrupulous individuals, and terrorists were
taking advantage of the asylum laws to avoid deportation and then to
abscond while their applications were languishing in the backlog.75
In response to these concerns, Congress passed the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA").
76
IIRIRA put into effect a number of provisions designed to curtail abuse
of the asylum system. The most significant limitations are a one-year
deadline on applying for asylum, delay in work authorization eligibility,
prompt adjudication of asylum applications, expedited removal, and de-
tention of asylum seekers. With these provisions in place, the hurdles to
obtaining asylum are so great that asylum has become an unlikely choice
for an individual seeking an easy, low-profile way to gain lawful immi-
gration status.
a. The One-Year Deadline
As of April 1, 1997, asylum seekers must file their applications for
asylum within one year of their entry into the United States. An appli-
cant's failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she
filed within one year of entry bars the applicant from asylum eligibility.77
Applicants may only overcome the bar if they demonstrate "changed
circumstances which materially affect the applicant's eligibility for asy-
lum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an ap-
plication .... The goal of this provision was to ensure that individu-
als applying for asylum were doing so as the result of an urgent need for
protection, rather than as a delay tactic to prolong an unauthorized stay in
the United States.
b. Prompt adjudication of asylum claims and delay in work
authorization eligibility
IIRIRA closed the loophole allegedly exploited by fraudulent asy-
lum seekers to remain indefinitely in the United States with employment
authorization by revoking employment authorization and mandating
prompt adjudication of asylum claims. First, IIRIRA plainly states that
"[a]n applicant for asylum is not entitled to employment authorization..
. .,,79 Congress authorized the Attorney General to provide for employ-
ment authorization via regulation, but stipulated that such authorization
"shall not be granted ... prior to 180 days after the date of filing of the
74. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1993).
75. See INS, ASYLUM REFORM, supra note 73, at 7.
76. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat.
3009, at 3009-546 to -724 (1996).
77. INA § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (West 2007).
78. INA § 208 (a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
79. INA § 208(d)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(d)(2).
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application for asylum., 80 Second, IIRIRA mandates that asylum cases
be adjudicated within one hundred eighty days of receipt of an asylum
application. 81
Given that asylum cases must be completed prior to the passing of
one hundred eighty days, very few asylum seekers will qualify for em-
ployment authorization absent a final grant of asylum. The regulations
stipulate that "[a]ny delay requested or caused by the applicant shall not
be counted as part of' the 180-day employment authorization time pe-
riod.82 Thus, asylum applicants whose cases are denied prior to the 180-
day time period having elapsed remain ineligible for employment au-
thorization while their cases are on appeal.
c. Expedited Removal
The expedited removal provisions of IIRIRA 83 authorize immigra-
tion officers at U.S. ports of entry to expel persons deemed inadmissible
for failure to provide valid entry documents. 84 Expedited removal or-
ders, though issued by fairly low-level immigration officers, are not re-
viewable by a judge.85 An individual who receives an order of expedited
removal is barred from reentering the United States for a minimum of
86five years.
Only those individuals who express a fear of returning to their home
country receive an opportunity to avoid being summarily deported.
IIRIRA provides that individuals who express a fear of returning to their
home country be interviewed by an asylum officer to determine whether
their expressed fear is credible.87 If the asylum officer determines from
the "credible fear" interview that the individual has a "significant possi-
bility ... [of] establish[ing] eligibility for asylum.. ,,,88 the individual
may remain in the United States to pursue asylum before an immigration
judge. 89 If the asylum officer does not believe the individual has a credi-
ble fear of persecution, the individual may be summarily removed. 90
80. Id.
81. INA § 208(d)(5)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii).
82. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(2) (2007).
83. INA § 235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
84. See INA § 212(a)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (rendering inadmissible persons who
attempt to commit fraud to enter the United States); NA § 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(7) (ren-
dering inadmissible persons who attempt to enter the United States without a visa).
85. INA §§ 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 242(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),
1252(a)(2)(A)(i).
86. INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i).
87. INA § 235(b)(l)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).
88. INA § 235(b)(l)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2007).
89. 8 C.F.R.§ 208.13 (b)(ii) (2007).
90. NA § 235(b)(I)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(l)(B).
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d. Detention of Asylum Seekers
Individuals subject to expedited removal for attempting to enter the
United States without valid documentation, including those claiming
asylum, are subject to mandatory detention under IIRIRA. 9 1 This applies
even after an individual claiming asylum establishes that he or she has a
credible fear of persecution. DHS usually detains asylum seekers in im-
migration detention facilities, or, more commonly, in county jails from
which the DHS rents bed space.92 An asylum seeker may be detained for
the duration of the adjudication of his or her asylum claim, a process
which often can take several years.
B. The U.S. Asylum System Post-September 11: The Real ID Act of 2005
The asylum system initially seemed to have escaped the fate of the
refugee resettlement program. There was no suspension of asylum proc-
essing, and, other than some backlog-creating adjustments to the security
checks, no significant disturbance to the asylum system. It was not until
nearly four years after the attacks that legislation was passed targeting
the asylum system in the name of counterterrorism.
1. Preventing Terrorists from Obtaining Relief from Removal
The Real ID Act of 2005 was passed as part of the Omnibus Iraq
Appropriations Bill.93 One section of the Real ID Act is entitled "Pre-
venting Terrorists from Gaining Relief from Removal, 94 and purports to
reform an asylum system that had become an easy target for infiltration
by terrorists. According to the principal sponsor of the legislation, then-
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee Representative James Sen-
senbrenner:
There is no one who is lying through their teeth that should be able to
get relief from the courts, and I would just point out that this bill
would give immigration judges the tool to get at the Blind Sheik who
wanted to blow up landmarks in New York, the man who plotted and
executed the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, the
man who shot up the entrance to the CIA headquarters in northern
Virginia, and the man who shot up the El Al counter at Los Angeles
International Airport. Every one of these non-9/1 1 terrorists who
tried to kill or did kill honest, law-abiding Americans was an asylum
91. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
92. AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION DETAINEE PRO BONO
OPPORTUNITIES GUIDE 1 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/
probonoguidefinal.pdf.
93. Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (2005).
94. Id. § 101.
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applicant. We ought to give our judges the opportunity to tell these
people no and to pass the bill.
95
Representative Sensenbrenner's assertions regarding the efficacy of the
Real ID Act are incorrect for two reasons. First, the terrorists cited by
Representative Sensenbrenner applied for asylum prior to legislative and
procedural changes to the asylum system, discussed above, that closed
many of the loopholes that they exploited. Second, most of the asylum
provisions in the Real ID Act already existed in case law, albeit in
clearer, more thoughtful language.
2. Credibility, Corroboration and Centrality of Motive
The Real ID Act addresses several areas of asylum law96: establish-
ing credibility; corroborating the asylum claim; and proving the persecu-
tor was motivated by one of the five grounds for asylum. There are two
main problems with the Real ID Act's focus. First, well-established case
law already thoroughly addressed these issues. Second, the Real ID
Act's language obscures and confuses the legal principles contained in
the case law.
a. Credibility
Credibility is arguably the most crucial aspect of any asylum case.
Because specific corroboration is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain in
many cases, an asylum applicant's testimony is often the most probative
evidence available. The credibility of that testimony therefore becomes
critical.
Courts have endeavored to strike a balance between protecting the
asylum system from fraud and accepting that certain factors, such as
trauma and cultural differences, may adversely impact credibility. Cur-
rent case law stipulates that asylum adjudicators take into account the
totality of the circumstances when making a credibility determination,
including such factors as demeanor, 97 plausibility, 98 and factual inconsis-
tencies and omissions.99
95. 151 CONG. REC. H453 (2005); see also H.R. REP. No. 109-72 at H2868 (2005) (Conf.
Rep.) (referencing Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman ("Blind Sheikh"), Ramzi Yousef (1993 World Trade
Center bombing), Ahmad Ajaj (1993 World Trade Center bombing), Mir Aimal Kansi (CIA attack),
and Hesham Mohamed Ali Hedayet (El Al Airlines murder)).
96. The Real ID Act addresses other immigration issues, including withholding of removal
and judicial review. It also addresses border security and driver's license issuance. These provi-
sions are beyond the scope of this Article.
97. See Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that credibility find-
ings based on demeanor deserve more deference that those based on testimonial analysis); Sarvia-
Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that an immigration judge is in the
unique position to observe the alien's tone and demeanor, to explore inconsistencies in the testi-
mony, and to determine whether the testimony has "the ring of truth"); Kokkinis v. Dist. Dir., 429
F.2d 938, 941-42 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that "great weight" should be afforded to the findings of
the special inquiry officer who conducted the deportation hearing, because, inter alia, he had the
opportunity to observe the respondent's demeanor); Matter of V-T-S-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 792, 796
1136 [Vol. 84:4
2007] COUNTERPRODUCTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM 1137
Immigration judges' credibility determinations receive a great deal
of deference from reviewing courts. 00 The Immigration and Nationality
Act authorizes Courts of Appeals to reject an immigration judge's credi-
bility determination only if a "reasonable adjudicator would be com-
pelled" to do so.' 0 ' Similarly, the Board of Immigration Appeals may
only overturn an immigration judge's credibility determination if the
decision is "clearly erroneous.' 0 2  In practice, so long as an adverse
credibility determination is based on more than bare speculation, 0 3 the
Courts of Appeals and the Board will generally uphold it.'0 4 Most Courts
of Appeals, however, have held that discrepancies and omissions that do
(B.I.A. 1997) (recognizing the immigration judge's "advantage of observing the alien as he testi-
fies").
98. See Salaam v. INS, 229 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that findings of implau-
sibility cannot be based upon unsupported assumptions); Matter of B-, 211. & N. Dec. 66, 71 (B.I.A.
1995) (holding that consistent, sufficiently detailed, and unembellished testimony may provide a
plausible and coherent account of the basis for the fear of persecution, without corroborating evi-
dence); Matter of Dass, 20 1. & N. Dec. 120, 124 (B.I.A. 1989) (holding that the court is to deter-
mine whether the alien's testimony is believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a
plausible and coherent account of the basis for his alleged fear); see also UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA, supra note 44, 204 (stating that "[tihe applicant's statements must be
coherent and plausible, and must not run counter to generally known facts").
99. See In re A-S-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 1106, 1109 (B.I.A. 1998) (refusing to overturn an immi-
gration judge's adverse credibility determination based on inconsistencies and omissions, because
the record revealed that "(1) the discrepancies and omissions described by the Immigration Judge are
actually present; (2) these discrepancies and omissions provide specific and cogent reasons to con-
clude that the respondent provided incredible testimony; and (3) the respondent has not provided a
convincing explanation for the discrepancies and omissions").
100. Credibility determinations based on demeanor receive particular deference because of the
immigration judge's opportunity to observe the applicant's testimony. See Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183
F.3d 1147, 1149-51 (9th Cir. 1999) (affording great deference to credibility determination based on
observation of demeanor); Kokkinis v. District Director, 429 F.2d 938, 941-42 (2d Cir. 1970) (hold-
ing that "great weight" should be afforded to the adjudicator who conducted the hearing because he
had the opportunity to observe the applicant's demeanor); Matter of V-T-S-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 792,
796 (B.I.A. 1997) (recognizing that an immigration judge has the advantage of observing an appli-
cant as he or she testifies).
101. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (West 2007).
102. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2007).
103. See, e.g., Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (overturning an
immigration judge's credibility determination based on "speculation and conjecture"); Unase v.
Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1042 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that an immigration judge's adverse credibil-
ity determination was unsupported by the record when the immigration judge relied on speculation
and tenuous logic).
104. See Kalitani v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2003) (upholding an immigration
judge's credibility determination based upon discrepancies in the applicant's testimony regarding
who procured the documents allowing her to enter the United States, inconsistencies regarding the
applicant's identity, and perceived implausibility in the applicant's account); Wu Biao Chen v. INS,
344 F.3d 272, 274-75 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding an adverse credibility determination based on the
applicant's hesitant and unconvincing testimony as well as several inconsistencies in his testimony);
Krouchevski v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that an applicant's assertions
that the inconsistencies present in his testimony were the result of translation errors and misunder-
standings were insufficient to overcome the "clearly erroneous" standard of review); Matter of R-S-
H-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 629, 637 (B.I.A. 2003) (upholding an immigration judge's adverse credibility
finding based on the "clearly erroneous" standard).
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not go to the heart of the claim are not an appropriate basis for an ad-
verse credibility determination. 10 5
In Matter of A-S-, 0 6 the Board of Immigration Appeals set out the
criteria for determining whether an adverse credibility determination
based on inconsistencies and omissions is supported by the record. First,
the discrepancies and omissions must actually be present in the record.'
0 7
Second, the discrepancies and omissions must provide specific and co-
gent reasons to conclude that the applicant provided incredible testi-
mony. 1 8 Finally, the applicant must have had an opportunity to explainthe discrepancies and omissions and must have failed to do so.10 9
The Real ID Act codifies the long-established prescription that ad-
judicators weigh the totality of the circumstances when making credibil-
ity determinations. 110 Yet, the Real ID Act departs from established case
law, and even INS guidelines,"' regarding whether adjudicators should
take into account minor inconsistencies and omissions by stating that
immigration judges may base a credibility determination on, inter alia,
inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or falsehoods "without regard to whether
an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the appli-
cant's claim ...., This provision of the Real ID Act thus eviscerates
an important safeguard against abuses of discretion and unjust denials of
asylum. Moreover, it does nothing to protect the system from fraudulent,
but well-memorized, claims.
b. Corroboration
Corroborating asylum claims presents significant challenges, espe-
cially in terms of logistics and authentication. Aside from the obvious
difficulty of obtaining direct corroboration from a persecutor, many asy-
105. See Kondakova v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 792, 796 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
1053 (2005) ("While minor inconsistencies and omissions will not support an adverse credibility
determination, inconsistencies or omissions that relate to the basis of persecution are not minor but
are at 'the heart of the asylum claim."'); Singh v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004)
("Minor inconsistencies in the record such as discrepancies in dates which reveal nothing about an
asylum applicant's fear for his safety are not an adequate basis for an adverse credibility finding."
(quoting Vilorio-Lopez v. INS, 852 F.2d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 1988))); see also Leia v. Ashcroft, 393
F.3d 427, 436 (3d Cir. 2005); Sylla v. INS, 388 F.3d 924, 926 (6th Cir. 2004); Capric v. Ashcroft,
355 F.3d 1075 (7th Cir. 2004).
106. 21 1. & N. Dec. 1106, 1110 (B.I.A. 1998) (noting that an individual fleeing persecution
may have difficulty "remembering exact dates when testifying before an immigration judge").
107. In re A-S-, 211. & N. Dec. at 1109.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101 (a)(3)(B)(iii), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005).
111. INS Supplementary Refugee/Asylum Adjudication Guidelines, reprinted in 67
INTERPRETER RELEASES 101, 102 (Jan. 22, 1990) [hereinafter INS Supplementary Guidelines] ("Mi-
nor inconsistencies, misrepresentations, or concealment in a claim should not lead to a finding of
incredibility where the inconsistency, misrepresentation or concealment is not material to the
claim.").
112. Compare Real lD Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Dir. B, § 101(a)(3)(B)(iii), 119 Stat. 231, 303
(2005), with INS Supplementary Guidelines, supra note 111, at 102.
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lum seekers arrive from countries that lack infrastructure, adequate
communication systems, and sometimes even a functioning govern-
ment. l 3  Obtaining documents, even ones as relatively common as a
birth certificate or medical report, can therefore involve logistical im-
pediments that often prove insurmountable. Additionally, persons escap-
ing persecution may leave behind important documents (such as identity
cards, birth certificates, medical records, etc.) when fleeing their coun-
tries, either in haste or in an attempt to conceal their identities from per-
secutors. 114  By attempting to obtain the documents later, an asylum
seeker risks interception of his or her mail, potentially exposing family
and friends to harassment by the persecuting entity. 15 Even documenta-
tion of physical trauma itself can be difficult to obtain, such as in rape
cases, with often little, if any, physical evidence.1 16 In many cases, there-
fore, the more legitimate the persecution, the less likely it is that the asy-
lum seeker will have the required proof.
Courts have recognized the unique challenges that asylum seekers
face in corroborating their claims. In 1987, the Board of Immigration
Appeals decided in Matter of Mogharrabi 17 that, due to the difficulty
asylum seekers often face in obtaining corroborating evidence, "the ap-
plicant's testimony [alone] will suffice if it is credible, detailed and spe-
cific. 1 1 8  Several Courts of Appeals adopted this reasoning," 9 and it
eventually made its way into the Code of Federal Regulations. 
20
113. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Refugees: 2004 Year in Review,
REFUGEES MAGAZINE, Jan. 1, 2005, at 8-12 (describing conditions in refugee-producing countries
around the world), available at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/41 e3a9fc4.pdf.
114. See Michele R. Pistone & Philip C. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved But Still
Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 8 (2001) (explaining that "records may take months or years to
compile because refugees usually leave them behind, and the documents may be available only in
the country from which the refugee has fled").
115. See id. (stating that "[e]ven if friends or family members can obtain copies of the docu-
ments, hostile governments may intercept international mail. Therefore, asylum applicants may
hesitate for a long time before asking others to put themselves at risk by requesting corroborating
records.").
116. See PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, EXAMINING ASYLUM SEEKERS: A HEALTH
PROFESSIONAL'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS OF TORTURE 54-57
(2001). The Guide states:
In the majority of political asylum applicants who allege sexual assault during torture, the
traumatic event(s) will have occurred months or years before the medical examination.
Therefore, most individuals will not have physical signs at the time of the examina-
tion.... Even on examination of the female genitalia immediately after rape there is
identifiable damage in less than 50% of cases. Anal examination of males and females af-
ter anal rape shows lesions in less than 30% of cases.
See id.
117. 19 1. & N. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
118. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 444 (relying on Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767
F.2d 1448, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985)).
119. See Cordon Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that due to "the
serious difficulty with which asylum applicants are faced in their attempts to prove persecution...
this court does not require corroborative evidence" from asylum applicants who have testified credi-
bly); Gumbol v. INS, 815 F.2d 406, 412 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360,
362 (6th Cir. 1984)) (holding that an asylum seeker must "present some specific facts, either through
objective evidence or through persuasive credible testimony, to show that his fear of persecution is
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Two years later, in Matter of Dass,'21 the Board clarified its holding
in Matter of Mogharrabi and articulated a general rule for corroboration:
where corroborating evidence is available, the applicant should present
it; when unavailable, the applicant should explain why. 122 The Board
further refined this holding in Matter ofS-M-J-, 123 clarifying that in cases
where corroborating evidence is reasonably expected, it should be pro-
vided. 124 The Board went on to say that if the applicant fails to present
such evidence, it "can lead to a finding that [the] applicant has failed to
meet her burden of proof.' 25 However, the Board noted that "specific
documentary corroboration of an applicant's particular experiences is not
required unless the supporting documentation is of the type that would
normally be created or available in the particular country and is accessi-
ble to the alien, such as through friends, relatives, or co-workers."'
' 26
Matter of S-M-J- also provides examples of the types of facts "easily
subject to verification"'127 for which adjudicators may reasonably expect
corroborating evidence. Those examples include "evidence of [the appli-
cant's] place of birth, media accounts of large demonstrations, evidence
of a publicly-held office, or documentation of medical treatment.'
128
The Real ID Act permits an asylum seeker to corroborate his or her
claim solely with his or her own testimony, so long as the testimony is
"credible ... persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demon-
strate that the applicant is a refugee."' 129 Even if that testimony is suffi-
cient to establish asylum eligibility, the Real ID Act, like Matter of S-M-
1-, permits adjudicators to require corroborating evidence: "Where the
trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that
corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be pro-
vided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot rea-
sonably obtain the evidence."'
130
'well-founded') (emphasis added)); Ganjour v. INS, 796 F.2d 832, 837 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 576 (7th Cir. 1984)) (holding that an asylum applicant "must
present specific facts, through objective evidence if possible, or through his or her own persuasive,
credible testimony, showing actual persecution or detailing some other good reason to fear persecu-
tion .... ).
120. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(a), 208.16(b) (2007).
121. 201. & N. Dec. 120 (B.I.A. 1989).
122. Id. at 124-25.
123. 211. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997).
124. See id. at 725 (holding that "[u]nreasonable demands are not placed on an asylum appli-
cant to present evidence to corroborate particular experiences (e.g., corroboration from the persecu-
tor). However, where it is reasonable to expect corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts
pertaining to the specifics of an applicant's claim, such evidence should be provided.").
125. Id. at 726 (emphasis added).
126. Id.; see also Matter of M-D-, 211. & N. Dec. 1180 (B.I.A. 1998), rev'd sub nom, Diallo v.
INS, 232 F.3d 279, 285 (2d. Cir. 2000) (upholding the BIA's determination that asylum applicants
should provide corroborating evidence when it is available).
127. S-M-J-,211.&N. Dec. at725.
128. Id.
129. Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101 (a)(3)(B)(ii), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005).
130. Id. (emphasis added).
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A close reading of this provision, however, demonstrates a signifi-
cant and troubling deviation from Matter of S-M-J-. Note that the statute
does not state, "Where the trier of fact reasonably determines" that the
applicant should provide corroborating evidence. This failure to hold
adjudicators to a standard of reasonableness when determining whether
corroboration is necessary or whether the corroboration provided is suf-
ficient, could potentially lead to abuse of discretion, inconsistent applica-
tion of the law, and the denial of valid asylum claims.' 3 1 Individuals
intending to abuse the asylum system, however, would likely have the
ability and resources to obtain falsified corroboration.
c. Centrality of Motive
An applicant for asylum must prove that the harm he or she suffered
amounted to persecution. The test for whether harm rises to the level of
persecution is threefold. First, the applicant must have suffered harm
severe enough to rise to the level of persecution. 132  Second, the harm
must have been committed by a government or an entity that the gov-
ernment is unable or unwilling to control. 133 Third, the harm must have
occurred on account of at least one of the five grounds of asylum: race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular so-
cial group. 134 The Real ID Act addresses the third component, stating
that asylum applicants must prove that one of the five grounds for asy-
lum was or will be "at least one central reason" for the persecution they
endured. 135
Many asylum cases involve "mixed motives," in which persecution
may have occurred on account of one or more non-protected grounds, as
well as one or more protected grounds. In 1992, the Supreme Court held
in INS v. Elias-Zacarias,136 that an applicant must provide "some evi-
dence ... direct or circumstantial" of the persecutor's motive.
37  The
Court further specified that establishing asylum eligibility does not re-
quire "direct proof of [the] persecutors' motives."138 Moreover, "an ap-
131. See Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 153-54 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that "[u]nless the BIA
anchors its demands for corroboration to evidence which indicates what the petitioner can reasona-
bly be expected to provide, there is a serious risk that unreasonable demands will inadvertently be
made.... What is (subjectively) natural to demand may not ... be (objectively) reasonable.").
132. See Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that detention for ten
days accompanied by daily beatings and hard labor constitutes persecution, even in the absence of
serious physical injury); Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that threats and
beatings combined with deprivation of livelihood and ability to leave home amount to persecution);
Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that persistent death threats and
assaults on one's family constitute persecution).
133. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A) (West 2007); see also, e.g., Galicia v. Asheroft, 396 F.3d 446,
448 (1st Cir. 2005); Abdulrahnan v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003); Llana-Castellon v.
INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1097-98 (10th Cir. 1994).
134. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (b)(2)(A) (2007).
135. Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101(a)(3)(B)(i), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005).
136. 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
137. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483.
138. Id.
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plicant does not bear the unreasonable burden of establishing the exact
motivation of a 'persecutor' where different reasons for actions are pos-
sible., 139 According to the Board of Immigration Appeals,140 "[s]uch a
rigorous standard would largely render nugatory the Supreme Court's
decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, and be inconsistent with the 'well-
founded fear' standard embodied in the 'refugee' definition.'
141
Despite this thorough, long-standing and well-reasoned analysis re-
garding persecutors' motives, the drafters of the Real ID Act saw fit to
require asylum applicants to prove that "race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at
least one central reason for persecuting the applicant." 142 This language
could be interpreted to impose exactly the unreasonable burden against
which the courts have long cautioned. Persecutors generally do not pro-
vide their victims with evidence of, insights into, or discussion about the
atrocities they commit. 143 Requiring asylum applicants to prove where in
the mind of their persecutors the motive resided (center, left of center,
clustered in the center with other non-protected grounds) is an impossible
burden for applicants to meet.' 44 An individual intending to abuse the
asylum system, however, need only obtain falsified documents to satisfy
this particular requirement.
CONCLUSION
The most deplorable aspect of the Real ID Act and the moratorium
on refugee resettlement is that they have harmed innocent individuals
while purporting to fight the war on terror. At best, the proposition that a
terrorist would spend years in a disease-ridden refugee camp, hoping
against all odds to be one of the one-half percent of refugees to be se-
lected for resettlement in the United States, is absurd. Similarly, the pro-
visions of the Real ID Act demonstrate a profound ignorance, or deliber-
ate ignoring, of the reality of September 11: that today's terrorists have
no need to navigate a burdensome asylum system in order to gain access
139. Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988)); see also Romilus v. Ashcrofl, 385 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[N]or
is [the asylum applicant] required to establish [the persecutors'] exact motivations.").
140. Matter of S-P-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 486, 489 (B.I.A. 1996).
141. Id.; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (holding that asylum
seekers must prove only a reasonable possibility of persecution in order to establish a well-founded
fear).
142. Real ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101(a)(3)(B)(i), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005)
(emphasis added).
143. See Bolanos-Hemandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Persecutors are
hardly likely to provide their victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution."). See also
generally Virgil Wiebe et al., Asking for a Note from Your Torturer: Corroboration and
Authentication Requirements in Asylum, Withholding and Torture Convention Cases, 01-10 Immigr.
Briefings 1 (Oct. 2001) (discussing in detail the corroboration requirements for asylum seekers).
144. See, e.g., Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 474 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[R]equiring an alien to
establish the specific intent of his/her persecutors could impose insurmountable obstacles .... ").
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to the United States-they need only apply for a nonimmigrant visa in
the comfort of their own country.

